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Political Analysis founders' library
Federalist No. 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison argues that all powers in the same hands is tyranny, but that Montesquieu's maxim does not require the three departments to be wholly separate. Federalist No. 48: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison argues that separating the departments on paper is not enough, and that the legislature, the most dangerous branch, must be checked by the others. Federalist No. 49: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Madison rejects Jefferson's plan to let two branches call a convention over breaches, warning that frequent appeals would erode respect for government. Federalist No. 50: Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Madison argues that periodical appeals to the people to correct breaches are no better than occasional ones, citing Pennsylvania's Council of Censors. Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Madison explains how to keep the branches in check: give each the means and motive to resist the others, because ambition must check ambition.