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Congress founders' library
Brutus No. 15: A Supreme Court Beyond Any Control Brutus argues that life-tenured federal judges, unremovable for their rulings and with no court above them, would hold power no free government should grant. Brutus No. 4: Representation Must Be Large Enough to Know and Be Trusted by the People Brutus argues that a House of so few members could not know or win the trust of the people, and that Congress's power over elections adds to the danger. Cato No. 5: A Vague Executive and a Representation Too Small Cato argues that the Constitution's language on the executive is dangerously vague and that a House with so few members is too weak against corruption. Cato No. 7: The Senate and President Too Closely Joined Cato warns that the Senate and President are linked so that neither checks the other, and that Congress's control over election rules is dangerous. Federal Farmer No. 2: Fair Representation, the Jury and a Bill of Rights The Federal Farmer argues that free government needs full and equal representation, jury trial from the neighborhood, and a declaration of fundamental rights. Federalist No. 52: The House of Representatives Madison examines who may vote for and serve in the House, and why two-year terms keep it dependent on the people. Federalist No. 53: The House of Representatives (Continued) Madison answers the maxim that where annual elections end, tyranny begins, and argues that two-year terms give members the knowledge to legislate well. Federalist No. 54: The Apportionment of Members Among the States Madison defends the three-fifths rule through a hypothetical Southern advocate; the compromise treated slaves as property and remains troubling. Federalist No. 55: The Total Number of the House of Representatives Madison argues that the House must be small enough to avoid mob rule but large enough to trust, balancing distrust of power with trust in the people. Federalist No. 56: The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Continued) Madison answers the charge that the House is too small to know local interests, arguing that federal lawmaking needs general knowledge a modest body can have. Federalist No. 57: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Madison answers the charge that the House will favor the few, noting that anyone may vote and serve, and that frequent elections bind members to the people. Federalist No. 58: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison argues that the House will grow with population, because of the census, state experience, and the House's advantage over the Senate. Federalist No. 59: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton argues that Congress must be able to regulate the time, place and manner of its own elections, since a government must be able to preserve itself. Federalist No. 60: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Continued) Hamilton argues that Congress could not rig elections to favor a class or region, since it would provoke revolt and meet the diversity of the Union. Federalist No. 61: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Continued) Hamilton finishes the defense of Congress's election power, pointing to flaws in some state constitutions and the need for uniform election timing. Federalist No. 62: The Senate Madison explains the Senate's qualifications, state appointment and equal state vote, and argues a senate corrects the instability of a single popular house. Federalist No. 63: The Senate Continued Madison says the Senate gives the government national character, responsibility and a check on sudden popular passion; representation is the American remedy. Federalist No. 64: The Powers of the Senate Jay defends the treaty power, giving it to the President with the Senate's consent, because secrecy, dispatch and the nation's best talent are needed. Federalist No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued Hamilton explains why the Senate tries impeachments, as the court best fitted to judge political offenses, and why the Supreme Court would not do. Federalist No. 66: Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton answers four objections to the Senate as an impeachment court, including mixed powers and corruption of the executive, and says the checks are sound.