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The Articles of Confederation, 1781 The first constitution of the United States, a league of sovereign states with a one-state, one-vote Congress that could not tax or regulate commerce. Brutus No. 1: The Danger of a Consolidated Government Over a Vast Republic The first Brutus essay warns that the Constitution would consolidate the states under unlimited national power, which a republic so large could not keep free. Centinel No. 1: A Plan That Lacks Responsibility to the People Centinel warns Pennsylvanians that the Constitution concentrates power in Congress, lacks accountability, and would end rights their state constitution secured. The Declaration of Independence, 1776 The 1776 statement of why thirteen colonies were dissolving their ties to Britain, grounded in natural rights, consent of the governed and a list of grievances. Federal Farmer No. 1: A Plan of Accommodation That Tends to Consolidation The Federal Farmer urges care before ratifying, warning that the plan leans toward consolidating the states into one government a free people could not sustain. Federalist No. 1: General Introduction Hamilton opens the series by asking whether Americans can build good government by reflection and choice, and promises to prove six points for the Union. Federalist No. 10: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Continued) Madison defines faction, argues its causes cannot be removed without destroying liberty, and says a large representative republic best controls its effects. Federalist No. 85: Concluding Remarks Hamilton closes the series, urging adoption now with amendments to follow, and arguing that the plan is not perfect but far better than the alternatives. The Northwest Ordinance, 1787 The 1787 law that organized the territory north of the Ohio River, set the path to statehood, protected basic rights, and banned slavery there. Cato No. 5: A Vague Executive and a Representation Too Small Cato argues that the Constitution's language on the executive is dangerously vague and that a House with so few members is too weak against corruption. Federalist No. 14: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison distinguishes a republic from a democracy and argues that a republic can govern a territory as large as the Union. Federalist No. 15: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton argues the Confederation fails because it legislates for states, not individuals, and that laws without enforcement are only advice. Federalist No. 16: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Continued) Hamilton argues that coercing states means civil war, so a government acting directly on citizens is the only alternative to anarchy. Federalist No. 17: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Continued) Hamilton answers the fear that a national government would swallow the states, arguing that the people's affections and daily concerns favor state governments. Federalist No. 18: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Continued) Madison, probably with Hamilton, surveys the Amphictyonic and Achaean leagues of ancient Greece and finds that weak central power led to quarrels and conquest. Federalist No. 19: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Continued) Madison, with Hamilton, examines the Holy Roman Empire, Poland and the Swiss cantons, finding that sovereign members and a weak head bred anarchy and war. Federalist No. 20: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Continued) Madison, with Hamilton, studies the United Netherlands and concludes that a government over governments tends toward anarchy and requires force to function. Federalist No. 21: Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton lists more defects of the Confederation: no sanction for its laws, no guaranty of state governments, and unfair quotas on the states. Federalist No. 22: Other Defects of the Present Confederation (Continued) Hamilton lists further flaws of the Confederation: no commerce power, quota-based armies, equal state votes, supermajority rules, and no national courts. Federalist No. 23: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton argues that defense powers must be unlimited because the dangers to a nation cannot be foreseen, and must rest with the national government. Federalist No. 24: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton answers the complaint that the Constitution lacks a ban on peacetime armies, pointing to frontier garrisons and the need for a navy. Federalist No. 25: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (Continued) Hamilton argues that restrictions on defense that cannot be observed weaken respect for the Constitution, and that militia alone cannot meet a regular army. Federalist No. 26: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton traces the English roots of fear of standing armies and argues the Constitution's two-year limit on army appropriations is a real safeguard. Federalist No. 27: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (Continued) Hamilton argues that federal laws reaching individuals, and the habit of familiarity, will win respect for the national government without large force. Federalist No. 28: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (Continued) Hamilton argues that emergency force may sometimes be needed, and that the people and the state governments remain the final check against national tyranny. Federalist No. 29: Concerning the Militia Hamilton defends Congress's power to organize and discipline the militia and ridicules the fear that the militia could become an instrument of tyranny. Federalist No. 37: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison sets out the difficulties the Convention faced in joining energy, stability and liberty, and asks critics to judge the result with candor. Federalist No. 38: The Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed (Continued) Madison points out that the plan's critics contradict one another and that the Convention's work should be compared with the Confederation, not with an ideal. Federalist No. 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison tests the Constitution against republican principles and finds it partly federal and partly national, with the people as the source of power. Federalist No. 40: On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison defends the Convention's authority to propose a new plan, arguing that forms must give way to substance and that the people have the final say. Federalist No. 41: General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison surveys the federal powers, beginning with defense, and answers the claim that the general welfare language is a blank check. Federalist No. 42: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison reviews the powers over foreign affairs and interstate commerce, and admits it would have been better to end the slave trade sooner than 1808. Federalist No. 43: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (Continued) Madison reviews miscellaneous powers, including the guarantee of republican government and ratification by nine states, and defends necessary-and-proper. Federalist No. 44: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison defends the limits on state power, such as bans on ex post facto laws, paper money and titles of nobility, and the necessary-and-proper clause. Federalist No. 45: The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison replies that federal powers are few and defined while the states keep numerous and indefinite ones, and that the people's welfare is the supreme object. Federalist No. 46: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison argues that state governments, as the people's agents, will have the advantage over the federal government in the people's attachment and in resistance. Federalist No. 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison argues that all powers in the same hands is tyranny, but that Montesquieu's maxim does not require the three departments to be wholly separate. Federalist No. 48: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison argues that separating the departments on paper is not enough, and that the legislature, the most dangerous branch, must be checked by the others. Federalist No. 49: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Madison rejects Jefferson's plan to let two branches call a convention over breaches, warning that frequent appeals would erode respect for government. Federalist No. 50: Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Madison argues that periodical appeals to the people to correct breaches are no better than occasional ones, citing Pennsylvania's Council of Censors. Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Madison explains how to keep the branches in check: give each the means and motive to resist the others, because ambition must check ambition. Federalist No. 62: The Senate Madison explains the Senate's qualifications, state appointment and equal state vote, and argues a senate corrects the instability of a single popular house. Federalist No. 63: The Senate Continued Madison says the Senate gives the government national character, responsibility and a check on sudden popular passion; representation is the American remedy. Federalist No. 64: The Powers of the Senate Jay defends the treaty power, giving it to the President with the Senate's consent, because secrecy, dispatch and the nation's best talent are needed. Federalist No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued Hamilton explains why the Senate tries impeachments, as the court best fitted to judge political offenses, and why the Supreme Court would not do. Federalist No. 66: Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton answers four objections to the Senate as an impeachment court, including mixed powers and corruption of the executive, and says the checks are sound. Federalist No. 67: The Executive Department Hamilton opens the series on the executive by exposing a false claim that the President could fill Senate vacancies, and complains of the unfair attacks. Federalist No. 68: The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton defends the method of choosing the President through electors, as a way to combine popular choice, informed judgment and resistance to faction. Federalist No. 69: The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton compares the proposed President with the British king and the New York governor, arguing the office is limited and elected, not a monarchy in disguise. Federalist No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton argues that a vigorous, single executive is essential to good government and that unity, duration, support and competent powers supply energy. Federalist No. 71: The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton argues that a four-year term gives the President firmness to resist legislative pressure and public whims without making him independent of the people. Federalist No. 72: Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered (Continued) Hamilton defends re-eligibility of the President, arguing that excluding a good official from another term would harm good behavior and stability. Federalist No. 73: The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton defends a salary the legislature cannot cut or raise during the term and the qualified veto, as a shield for the executive and a check on bad laws. Federalist No. 74: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton defends the President's role as commander in chief and the pardoning power, arguing that war needs unity and that mercy should not be fettered. Federalist No. 75: The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton argues that treaties should be made by the President with two thirds of the Senate, because neither could be trusted alone with so delicate a power. Federalist No. 76: The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton defends presidential nomination with Senate confirmation, as a way to secure fit appointees while keeping responsibility clear. Federalist No. 77: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton argues the Senate's role in appointments adds stability, that cabals plague councils of appointment, and notes the President's remaining powers. Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, 1801 Thomas Jefferson's 1801 address after a bitter election: unite, keep government limited and frugal, and seek peace with all nations and alliances with none. Washington's Farewell Address, 1796 George Washington's parting advice: preserve the Union, beware of party spirit, honor religion and morality, keep public credit, avoid permanent alliances. Brutus No. 15: A Supreme Court Beyond Any Control Brutus argues that life-tenured federal judges, unremovable for their rulings and with no court above them, would hold power no free government should grant. Brutus No. 4: Representation Must Be Large Enough to Know and Be Trusted by the People Brutus argues that a House of so few members could not know or win the trust of the people, and that Congress's power over elections adds to the danger. Cato No. 7: The Senate and President Too Closely Joined Cato warns that the Senate and President are linked so that neither checks the other, and that Congress's control over election rules is dangerous. Federal Farmer No. 2: Fair Representation, the Jury and a Bill of Rights The Federal Farmer argues that free government needs full and equal representation, jury trial from the neighborhood, and a declaration of fundamental rights. Federalist No. 52: The House of Representatives Madison examines who may vote for and serve in the House, and why two-year terms keep it dependent on the people. Federalist No. 53: The House of Representatives (Continued) Madison answers the maxim that where annual elections end, tyranny begins, and argues that two-year terms give members the knowledge to legislate well. Federalist No. 54: The Apportionment of Members Among the States Madison defends the three-fifths rule through a hypothetical Southern advocate; the compromise treated slaves as property and remains troubling. Federalist No. 55: The Total Number of the House of Representatives Madison argues that the House must be small enough to avoid mob rule but large enough to trust, balancing distrust of power with trust in the people. Federalist No. 56: The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Continued) Madison answers the charge that the House is too small to know local interests, arguing that federal lawmaking needs general knowledge a modest body can have. Federalist No. 57: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Madison answers the charge that the House will favor the few, noting that anyone may vote and serve, and that frequent elections bind members to the people. Federalist No. 58: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison argues that the House will grow with population, because of the census, state experience, and the House's advantage over the Senate. Federalist No. 59: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton argues that Congress must be able to regulate the time, place and manner of its own elections, since a government must be able to preserve itself. Federalist No. 60: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Continued) Hamilton argues that Congress could not rig elections to favor a class or region, since it would provoke revolt and meet the diversity of the Union. Federalist No. 61: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Continued) Hamilton finishes the defense of Congress's election power, pointing to flaws in some state constitutions and the need for uniform election timing.