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The Northwest Ordinance Banned Slavery From a Territory Bigger Than France

The 1787 ordinance made new states equals, listed rights before the Bill of Rights and barred slavery north of the Ohio. Read its articles closely.

Ask a hundred Americans to name the great founding documents and you will hear two, perhaps three. The Declaration. The Constitution. Somebody in the back will say the Bill of Rights, and he will be right to. Almost nobody says the one that governed more land than any of them, wrote slavery's first national boundary into law, and was so good that the very first Congress under the new Constitution took the trouble to re-enact it.

That is the Northwest Ordinance, and it deserves a better reputation than a footnote in a chapter on westward expansion. It was written by a Congress that was supposedly dying, passed in a city the Constitutional Convention had left behind, and it did more to shape the map of free America than most of the statutes that came after. Let us read it the way the Founding generation wrote it: slowly, and with the text in front of us.

The Congress that was supposed to be useless

Begin with the setting, because the setting is the surprise. On July 13, 1787, the Confederation Congress sat in New York City. One hundred miles southwest, in Philadelphia, delegates were closeted behind shuttered windows writing the Constitution that would replace the body in New York. The Articles of Confederation had no president, no national courts and no power to tax. Congress could ask the states for money, and the states could politely decline.

Historians like to describe the Confederation Congress as a failure, and in many respects it was. But a government that cannot tax can still govern territory, because the land belonged to the United States as a whole. The states with western claims, Virginia chief among them, had ceded those claims to the national government. The old Articles gave Congress no clear power over the territory, yet somebody had to settle the question: who governs the settlers, and what are they to become?

Congress answered in three steps. The Land Ordinance of 1785 set up a survey of the western lands in a grid of townships, each six miles square, divided into thirty-six numbered sections, with one section in each township reserved for public schools. The ordinance of 1787 then supplied the government and the rights. The Constitution, written the same summer, would later give Congress express power over the territory in Article IV, Section 3: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." The Ordinance came first. The Constitution ratified the idea.

What the ordinance actually did

Before we read the clauses, let us define the terms, because a document this old comes with a vocabulary of its own.

A territory is land owned by the national government but not yet organized into a state. A state is a permanent member of the Union with its own government and its own seats in Congress. The question the Ordinance answered is how the first becomes the second, and the answer was not what the great empires of Europe would have done. Britain's colonies had been possessions to be managed from afar. The Ordinance said that these settlers would not be colonists forever. They would be citizens in waiting.

The structure had three stages. In the first, Congress appointed a governor, a secretary and three judges, and the territory was ruled by officers sent from the East. When the territory reached five thousand free adult male inhabitants, it could elect a general assembly. And when any part of it reached sixty thousand free inhabitants, that part could be admitted "into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever." Those are the words of Article V, and the key phrase is "equal footing." No second-class states. No permanent tutelage. A settler's grandson in Ohio would sit in the same Congress as a Virginian's grandson in Richmond.

The Ordinance also anticipated between three and five states from the territory, and that is exactly how it came out. Ohio entered the Union in 1803, Indiana in 1816, Illinois in 1818, Michigan in 1837 and Wisconsin in 1848. The northeastern part of what became Minnesota was part of the territory too. Look at a map and you will see it: a block of states that never legalized slavery, running from the Ohio River to the Great Lakes, and stretching across ground larger than France. Encyclopedia estimates of the territory's area run past 300,000 square miles, well above the area of metropolitan France. Check the figure for yourself, because estimates vary with how the boundaries are drawn.

Article I: a conscience before the First Amendment

Now the text. Article I of the ordinance's six "Articles of compact" opens with a guarantee of religious freedom: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments, in the said territory."

Mark the date. The First Amendment was two years away and would be written to restrain only Congress. Yet here, in a document governing the settlers' daily lives, is a promise that no peaceable person shall be molested for how he worships. The word "demeaning," by the way, is the eighteenth-century sense of conducting oneself. It is a condition, and a modest one: be peaceable and orderly, and your conscience is your own.

Article II follows with the rights English lawyers had spent six centuries wringing out of kings. The inhabitants "shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury," to proportionate representation, to bail except for capital offenses, and to protection against "cruel or unusual punishments." That last phrase, with its "or" in place of the later Eighth Amendment's "and," is a small gift to anyone who enjoys textual detective work. The Article also forbids any law that would "interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously formed," which is a rough forerunner of the Constitution's Contract Clause. If you want to know what the men of 1787 thought a free people required, here is the list, drafted before the Bill of Rights was a gleam in James Madison's eye. We have a related post that follows the Bill of Rights down its own long road to the states: How the Bill of Rights Came to Bind the States, One Right at a Time.

Article III: the sentence everyone quotes and nobody finishes

Article III is the famous one, and it is usually quoted in half. The half is the good half, and I will give you the whole of it.

Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.

Read that as a statement of political theory. It is not a statement that government exists to teach religion. It says that good government depends on a people formed by three things, and that the public should therefore see to it that schools exist. It is the Founding generation's answer to a question every republic must face, which is how a self-governing people becomes fit to govern itself. The answer: by habits of character and by learning, and these things do not arrive by accident. We take up the school clause on its own in Religion, Morality and Knowledge, the Northwest Ordinance's School Clause, and the point there stands here too: the framers did not imagine that the republic could be neutral about whether its citizens were literate.

The second sentence of Article III is the one that gets cut off, and it should not be. It continues:

The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.

I would be a poor guide if I told you the United States lived up to that promise. It did not, and the history of the Ohio country in the years after 1787 is a record of broken faith as much as kept faith. The ordinance is not a scorecard of what America did. It is a statement of what America said it would do, and a nation can be judged by the distance between the two. A conservative who reveres the Founding does not need to flinch from that distance. He can say that the principle was written down in 1787, that it was violated, and that the violation was a failure of fidelity to the founding text and not an expression of it.

Article VI: the line north of the Ohio

Now the article that earns the title. Article VI reads:

There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.

Two things at once, and an honest reader has to hold both. The first clause is the first national prohibition of slavery in any American territory. The Confederation Congress approved the ordinance as a whole by a vote of 17 to 1, and it did so before the Constitution existed. The second clause, the proviso, is a fugitive-slave provision. It is the seed of the clause that would appear in the Constitution itself in Article IV, Section 2, and of the Fugitive Slave Acts that grew from it.

The compromise is not pretty, and I do not intend to dress it up. But look at what it accomplished. It drew a line. Below the Ohio, slavery's future would be fought out state by state. Above it, the national government had spoken, and what it said was that the territory would be free. The Ordinance's own language made the prohibition a "compact" between the original states and the people of the territory, to remain "forever unalterable, unless by common consent." It was not a policy a later Congress could drop with a simple majority.

Did it hold perfectly? No. Indentured-servant laws in the territory let some slaveholders bring enslaved people in, and efforts to legalize slavery in Indiana and Illinois in the 1820s tested its edges. Illinois had to fight off a campaign for a convention to legalize slavery in 1824, and the voters said no. The point is not that the line was never pressed. The point is that it held, and that when the pressure came, the fact that Congress had said "forever" in 1787 gave free-soil forces something concrete to stand on.

When the Civil War came, the free states of the old Northwest sent men and money in great number. A line drawn in July 1787 shaped the electoral arithmetic of 1860.

The strongest objection, and the answer

Here is the steelman. A critic might say that the Ordinance is a flattering story told by people who want to wring a clean conscience out of a compromised founding. It protected slavery's escape clause, it let slaveholders retrieve fugitives from the territory, and it came from a Congress that, in the same decade, accepted the Constitution's three-fifths clause and its twenty-year protection for the slave trade. If the Founders were truly against slavery, the critic says, they would have banned it everywhere. The Ordinance proves that a free-soil line could be drawn where it cost slaveholders nothing, because the land north of the Ohio was not where their plantations lay.

That is the strongest version, and parts of it are true. It was easier to ban slavery in territory that no slaveholder yet owned. The fugitive proviso is real. The Founding generation left slavery alive where it already existed, and the full cost of that choice came due in 1861.

Now the answer, in points.

One. The objection proves too much. Every moral advance in history is easier where the opposition has no entrenched interest, and that is not a reason to discount the advance. It is a reason to understand how reformers actually win: by securing ground where they can and holding it.

Two. The ban was a deliberate choice, not an accident of drafting. The Confederation Congress put it in the text and approved the whole ordinance by 17 to 1, which shows how many delegates thought the question was worth deciding in favor of freedom.

Three. The ban set a precedent that the national government had the power to exclude slavery from a territory. That precedent stood for decades, and the Dred Scott decision of 1857, which denied that Congress could bar slavery from the territories, is exactly why that decision belongs among the Court's greatest errors. We tell that story in Dred Scott Is the Warning Every Fan of Judicial Supremacy Should Read.

Four. The Founding is judged fairly when it is judged against its alternatives and against its own stated principles. The alternative to the Ordinance was not an immediate national abolition that no delegate could have delivered. The alternative was an open Northwest in which slavery would have taken root in the Ohio valley. On the principles, the Declaration says that all men are created equal, and the Ordinance is among the first places where that sentence was turned into a legal consequence. We take up the broader question of how to hold the Founders to account in How to Judge the Founders Fairly Without Excusing Slavery or Erasing Them.

Do not skip the rest of the compact. Article IV says that the territory and its states "shall forever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of America" and shall be subject to the Articles of Confederation and to the acts of Congress. It requires that the inhabitants pay their share of the public debt, and it says that the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence "shall be common highways and forever free." That last clause is easy to overlook. It is a guarantee that the rivers and portages of the West would be open to all, and it anticipates the Constitution's later concern for commerce flowing freely among states. For that concern read What Commerce Among the Several States Meant to the Men Who Wrote It.

Article V provides for not fewer than three nor more than five states and fixes the sixty-thousand threshold. Article II's protections for contracts and Article III's promise about schools and Indian lands fit together with the rest into a thing a modern lawyer would call a constitution for the territory. It is no accident that the Ordinance is sometimes called the Confederation's one great achievement. It was a framework document that told settlers how they would be governed, what they could not be forced to endure, and what they might become.

Why the First Congress re-enacted it

When the first Congress met under the new Constitution, one of the earliest laws it passed, approved on August 7, 1789, adapted the Ordinance to the new government. The change was mostly one of machinery: the appointing power now belonged to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and not to the old Congress. The substance carried on.

Think about what that means. The men who had just finished writing the Constitution looked at the Ordinance and did not replace it. They kept it. They did not feel that their own constitution made it obsolete. They treated it as law the republic would live under, and so it stood beside the Constitution in the statute books, a companion piece and not a rival. If you ask why historians sometimes rank it with the Declaration and the Constitution, the re-enactment is the best argument. It is the one founding text that both governments, the dying and the new, endorsed.

What it means now

Three lessons come out of the text, and each applies today.

First, a nation can build free institutions by rule. The Ordinance did not depend on the virtue of any one governor. It set the thresholds, the guarantees and the path to statehood in advance, and then trusted the settlers to do the rest. When people say that law cannot make a free society, point them here. Law did not make Ohio free by itself, but it cleared the ground and held the line.

Second, rights come before majorities. Article II's guarantees applied from the first day of a territory's existence, before any legislature met and before any voter cast a ballot. Rights that depend on the consent of the majority are privileges. These were written as limits.

Third, principle and compromise can live in one document, and honest history must say so. The Ordinance gave us a free Northwest and a fugitive clause. Both are true. The conservative reading of the founding is not the reading that ignores the compromise, nor the reading that treats the compromise as the whole story. It is the reading that asks what the text did, and answers with the text.

The case in brief

  1. The Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, governed a territory larger than France and set the path from territory to statehood on terms of equal footing.
  2. Articles I and II guaranteed religious freedom, habeas corpus, jury trial and other rights before the Bill of Rights existed.
  3. Article III tied good government to "Religion, morality, and knowledge" and promised the Indians good faith, a promise the country too often broke.
  4. Article VI barred slavery and involuntary servitude north of the Ohio, with a fugitive proviso, and the free states it produced shaped the Union's survival.
  5. The First Congress re-enacted the Ordinance in 1789, which tells us the Founders themselves counted it as a foundation.

What you can do: read Articles I through VI of the Northwest Ordinance in full, then check which of your own state's rights guarantees trace to it, starting with your state constitution's bill of rights.

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