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Shelby County v. Holder Asked Whether Old Data Could Still Govern the States

Shelby County did not repeal the Voting Rights Act. It held that a formula built on 1960s turnout data could not keep singling out states. Section 2 stands.

A law is passed to cure a specific disease. Forty-eight years later, the doctor is still prescribing from a chart of the patient's condition in 1964. Nobody can say the patient is the same. Nobody is allowed to update the chart. And anyone who suggests it might be time for a new examination is accused of wanting the patient to die.

That, in one paragraph, is the fight over Shelby County v. Holder. It is also why most of what you heard about the decision, in headlines and on the stump, was wrong. The Court did not strike down the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It did not end federal protection against racial discrimination in voting. It held that one formula, in one section, could no longer justify treating some states differently from others, because it was built on data that was decades old. This post lays out what the Act did, what the Court held, what the dissent said, and why Section 2 of the Act is still in force.

Define the terms

Four terms do all the work in this case.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is the nationwide ban. It prohibits any voting practice or procedure that results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color. It applies in every state, always.

Section 4(b) is the coverage formula. It decided which states and counties were "covered jurisdictions." As written in 1965, a jurisdiction was covered if it used a "test or device" for voter registration (a literacy test, for example) as of November 1, 1964, and if fewer than half of its voting-age residents were registered or had voted in the 1964 presidential election. Later reauthorizations added the elections of 1968 and 1972 to the data.

Section 5 is preclearance. A covered jurisdiction could not change any voting rule, from a precinct line to a ballot form, until it proved to the Department of Justice or a federal court in Washington that the change had no discriminatory purpose or effect. The burden sat on the state. That is the unusual part. In every other area of law, the person who says a law is unlawful has to prove it.

Equal sovereignty is the principle that the states enter the Union on the same footing. The Court had stated it in Coyle v. Smith in 1911, and it became the center of Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning.

What the Act did, and why it was extraordinary

By 1965 the Fifteenth Amendment had been in the Constitution for ninety-five years. Its text is plain: the right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Its second section gives Congress the power to enforce the guarantee "by appropriate legislation."

For nearly a century, that promise was strangled by the oldest trick in the book. When Congress or a court struck down one discriminatory device, a county invented another. Literacy tests gave way to understanding tests, which gave way to registrars who simply decided who passed. Lawsuits were filed one county at a time, and by the time a court ruled, the next election had come and gone. Preclearance flipped the order of operations. The change was frozen until the state proved it was clean.

The Supreme Court upheld this remedy in South Carolina v. Katzenbach in 1966. The reasoning was that Congress had found "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution," and that exceptional conditions justified exceptional measures. The Court accepted that Section 5 intruded on state authority, and said the intrusion was justified by the record Congress had assembled.

Two points about that decision matter. First, the remedy was temporary. The original Act's special provisions were set to last five years. Second, the justification was an emergency. Both points came back in 2013.

The extensions

Congress renewed the special provisions in 1970, 1975 and 1982, and added updated trigger years along the way. In 1982 it extended the preclearance regime for twenty-five years. In 2006 it extended it again, for another twenty-five years, by overwhelming bipartisan margins: the Senate vote was unanimous, 98 to 0, and the House vote was 390 to 33. The reauthorization came with a thick record of hearings.

Here is the problem. Through all of those extensions, Congress left the coverage formula essentially untouched. The trigger was still the 1964, 1968 and 1972 data. Congress had spent months collecting evidence about voting practices in the 2000s, and then applied it to a formula that had been fixed in the 1970s. The record described one country, and the formula was drawn from another.

Congress also created a "bailout" procedure, which let a jurisdiction escape coverage by showing a clean record for ten years. Bailout was real but narrow, and most covered jurisdictions never used it.

The case

Shelby County, Alabama, a suburban county outside Birmingham, was covered by Section 4(b), because Alabama as a whole was covered. The county sued, arguing that Sections 4(b) and 5 exceeded Congress's authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. The lower courts rejected the challenge.

The Supreme Court had signaled where it was heading four years earlier. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder in 2009, the Court decided the case on narrow statutory grounds but warned that the preclearance regime raised "serious constitutional questions." Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Act imposed current burdens and must be justified by current needs. The lesson of that warning was clear to anyone who read it. Congress did not draw it.

On June 25, 2013, the Court decided Shelby County 5 to 4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion.

The holding, in four steps

Here is the structure of the majority's reasoning, set out the way a careful reader should hold it.

  1. Preclearance departs from two basic features of our system. It is a federal veto over state laws, and it applies to some states and not others. The Court said such a departure needs a justification equal to the burden. In 1966 the justification was the history of systematic evasion.
  2. Equal sovereignty is a real constitutional principle. The Court said it is not unlimited, because Congress can sometimes treat states differently when the facts differ. But the differences have to be tied to the problem the law is meant to solve, and the principle means the justification must be current.
  3. The facts changed. The majority pointed to the gap in registration and turnout between Black and white voters, which in covered states had fallen sharply or disappeared. It noted that the tests and devices that triggered coverage had been banned nationwide for decades (a nationwide ban began in 1970 and was made permanent in 1975). It also noted that in several covered states Black turnout had matched or exceeded white turnout in recent elections. The Court's line was that the country had changed.
  4. The formula did not track the change. Section 4(b) was based on forty-year-old facts having no logical relationship to the present day. Congress reenacted the formula in 2006 without asking whether the 1960s data still described who was discriminating. Because Congress could not rely on that formula, the Court held Section 4(b) unconstitutional and said Section 5 could not be enforced without a valid coverage formula.

Look at what the Court did not say. It did not hold that racial discrimination in voting had ended. The opinion said the opposite in so many words: voting discrimination still exists and no one doubts it. It did not hold that Congress lacks power to protect voting. It said Congress may draw a new formula "based on current conditions." It left Section 5 itself on the books, with nothing to trigger it. And it left Section 2 alone.

Justice Thomas, concurring, would have gone further and held Section 5 itself unconstitutional. The majority did not.

The dissent, stated fairly

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, wrote a dissent that deserves to be stated in its strongest form, because it is a serious argument and not a slogan.

Her case had three parts. First, the Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress broad enforcement power, and the Court had always reviewed that power deferentially. Second, Congress had compiled a record of more than fifteen thousand pages in 2006, and had found that second-generation barriers, such as vote dilution through at-large elections and gerrymandered districts, still plagued covered jurisdictions. Third, and best known, she argued that preclearance was the reason the improvements existed in the first place. She compared throwing out preclearance because it had worked to discarding your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.

That is a clever line, and it deserves a straight answer. The answer is in the formula, not the metaphor. If you carry an umbrella because it rained in 1964, you are entitled to ask whether it is raining on you today and not on your neighbor. The question in Shelby County was never whether preclearance had worked. Everyone agreed it had. The question was whether Congress had shown that the specific states and counties on the 1965 list were the right ones to keep under the umbrella, while states with comparable or worse current records were outside it. The formula could not say. It was a map of 1964 being used to navigate 2006.

There is a second answer. The "it worked, therefore it must continue" argument proves too much. By its logic, no emergency measure could ever be retired, because every successful emergency measure produces the calm that makes it look unnecessary. The Founders understood that temporary powers have a way of becoming permanent. Powers granted for an emergency need a way out, and the Constitution's design depends on Congress having to justify its choices again with current evidence.

Why equal sovereignty matters to conservatives

Some conservatives cheered Shelby County for the wrong reasons. They treated it as a victory over the Voting Rights Act. It was not, and the argument for the decision does not rest on hostility to the Act.

The argument rests on federalism and on the rule of law. The Constitution leaves the administration of elections to the states, subject to the amendments that forbid racial discrimination. Article I, Section 4 gives the states the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections" for Congress, and Congress may alter those regulations. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the powers not delegated. A federal veto over state election law is a deep intrusion into that arrangement. It can be justified, as it was in 1966, but it requires a justification that is current, and it requires that the burden fall on the places where the problem is.

There is also a principle of fairness here that conservatives have always cared about. A law that treats citizens or governments differently must be able to say why, today, with evidence. That is what the Court demanded. It is the same demand conservatives make of every other government classification. If you want the courts to hold race-based government programs to a standard of current justification, you cannot excuse a geographic classification from the same discipline because you like its purpose.

Section 2 survived, and Allen v. Milligan proves it

The strongest evidence that the Voting Rights Act is alive is that it keeps winning in the Supreme Court.

Section 2 is enforced through private lawsuits and Department of Justice suits after a law is in place. It does not freeze changes in advance. The test comes from Thornburg v. Gingles in 1986: a plaintiff challenging a district map must show that a minority group is large and compact enough to form a majority in a reasonably configured district, that it votes cohesively, and that the white majority usually votes as a bloc to defeat its candidates. Then the court looks at the totality of the circumstances.

In Allen v. Milligan, decided in 2023, Alabama drew a congressional map with one majority-Black district out of seven, in a state with a large Black population. A three-judge district court found a likely Section 2 violation and ordered a second district. The Supreme Court affirmed, 5 to 4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the author of Shelby County. Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority and wrote separately. The decision applied Gingles and rejected Alabama's attempt to replace it with a test comparing the state's map to computer-generated maps drawn without regard to race.

Read together, the two cases make a pattern. The same Chief Justice who held that the old formula could not stand also held that the nationwide ban remains enforceable and means what it says. The Court two years earlier, in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee in 2021, narrowed how Section 2 applies to ordinary election rules such as precinct-based voting and ballot collection rules. So the picture is not one of unlimited enforcement. It is a statute with real force, applied by a Court that reads its text.

What Congress could do

The decision left an open door. Congress may write a new formula, justified by current data, and the Court said so. In the years since, the political argument has been over what that formula should be, and no replacement has become law. I will not tell you what the current state of the legislative effort is, because it changes, and you can check it on Congress.gov. What matters is the structure: the remedy is back in the hands of the branch that is accountable to voters.

That is the right place for it. A formula that triggers federal supervision of elections should be written by people who stand for election, with evidence gathered now, and defended in public. A formula that persists because nobody wants to vote on it is not a protection. It is a habit.

Three misreadings to avoid

  • "The Court gutted the Act." It struck one formula. Section 2, the nationwide ban, the Fifteenth Amendment and the Justice Department's enforcement power all remain, and the Court has enforced Section 2 since.
  • "The Court said discrimination is over." It said the reverse, and said conditions had improved enough that the old formula was not a fair measure of where the problems are.
  • "Congress can't act." Congress can write a new coverage formula. It simply has to do the work.

The case in brief

  1. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a justified answer to a century of evasion, and the Court upheld it in 1966 because the emergency was real.
  2. Shelby County v. Holder (2013) did not strike down the Act. It held that Section 4(b), a coverage formula fixed by 1960s and 1970s data, could not justify treating some states differently without current evidence.
  3. The principle is that federal power over state elections requires current justification, a standard conservatives apply to every other government classification.
  4. Section 2 survives and has force, as Allen v. Milligan (2023) shows, so the claim that the Act was gutted is false.
  5. The next move belongs to Congress, which can write a new formula based on present facts and answer for it at the ballot box.

What you can do: read Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act on Congress.gov, then look up how your own state's elections are run and who your representatives in Congress are at the representatives page.

Related reading on the Court and its tools: Stare Decisis Explained, and the Factors Justices Weigh Before Overruling, Standing Explained, the Doorway Rule That Keeps Courts Out of Politics, Moore v. Harper and the Independent State Legislature Theory That Lost, Seven Myths About the Roberts Court, Tested Against Its Own Opinions, Justice Harlan's Lone Dissent in Plessy and the Colorblind Constitution.

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