The Calculus of Consent by {author}: summary and why it matters

What it argues

Buchanan and Tullock decided to treat politicians, voters and officials as people with ordinary motives, pursuing their own interests under the rules they face, rather than as selfless servants of the public good. From that premise they analyze collective decision-making.

They show that majority rule can impose costs on minorities, and that requiring larger majorities cuts those external costs while raising the costs of reaching a decision. Logrolling, in which legislators trade votes, can lead to overspending, and special interests often gain at general cost. The authors urge the choice of rules at a constitutional stage, behind a veil of uncertainty about one's future interests, and favor constraints on government that rational citizens would select.

The book borrows from the American framers, especially Madison.

Why it matters

Public choice gave conservatives and libertarians a rigorous account of why government fails as well as markets, and Buchanan received the Nobel Prize in 1986. The book explains why balanced-budget rules, term limits and supermajority requirements keep returning to debate.

About the author

James M. Buchanan (1919-2013) taught at the University of Virginia and George Mason University and received the 1986 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making. His coauthor Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) had been a diplomat in China and Korea before turning to economics.

Who should read it

Readers of political economy with some tolerance for technical analysis.